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THE PROBLEM 
Attackers find the multimedia world in general and video streaming in particular, an attractive 
backdoors for their cyber-attacks. Multimedia covert channels provide reasonable bandwidth and 
long lasting transmission streams, suitable for planting malicious information and therefore used 
as an exploit alternative. Most attack algorithms that use video focus on planting malicious 
information inside the video headers. Such techniques are easy to detect and provide a limited 
delivery bandwidth, therefore increasing attackers’ motivation to use video payload exploit. In 
this article we propose a method to protect against attacks that use the video payload.  The 
payload is the part of the transmitted video data that carries the actual picture content viewed by 
the movie viewers (users). Therefore, it is more challenging to protect against such attacks - 
nobody can argue with the actual image content.  
In this paper, we will demonstrate attacks that take advantage of video payload and in addition 
propose a set of defense techniques for improving defense efficiency. 
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BACKGROUND 
Estimated Motion Vectors (EMV) are used in streaming video transmission to describe Macro-
Blocks’ (MBs) estimated movement between video frames. The attack algorithm will take 
advantage of lack of sensitivity of movie viewers to small deviations of Macro-Block (object) 
movements from their original path. Viewers are not likely to notice minor noise around moving 
MBs. Moreover, since the viewer does not know the accurate real position of MBs in the original 
video movie, they are not likely to notice minor displacement changes that affect MBs position 
accuracy. 
Video compression protocols, such as E.264 for example, are based on estimating MBs 
movement (represented by EMVs). In order to minimize the number of bits required to represent 
transmitted EMVs, the algorithm assumes that neighboring MBs statistically move in similar 
vector values (size and direction). Therefore, it is possible to transmit only the EMVs delta 
values compared to neighboring MBs. In order to find the EMV delta value, a Median of all 
neighboring MBs EMV is calculated and only the delta is sent (Error Vector). 
 
 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The cyber-attack algorithm is based on identifying MBs with relatively small displacement 
movement compared to other neighboring MBs, and using their displacement content as place 
holders for malicious data. Common video streams contain many such MBs, thus providing an 
effective exploit covert channel with reasonable bandwidth potential (kbps). 
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METHOD 
The cyber-attack is based on the criteria of finding all Error Vectors that are lower than a pre-
defined threshold value (e.g. |Error Vector| ≤ √2).  
For example, the Error Vectors that are lower than √2 are: 
(-1,-1) (0,-1) (1,-1) 
(-1,0) (0,0) (1,0) 
(-1,1) (0,1) (1,1) 
These nine (9) Error Vector positions can be used as a dictionary for conveying malicious data. 
They can represent eight (8) different values (equivalent to 3 bits – 000 - 111) plus one 
additional value (the center – 0,0). The following table illustrates the 8 + 1 dictionary options 
corresponding to the above Error Vectors. 
7 0 1 
6 X 2 
5 4 3 
Where X can be used as a special character, such as ‘New Line’, ‘Space’, etc. 
For example, the encoder (or a proxy) that implements the algorithm will search in the frames for 
Error Vectors which meet the criteria. Let’s assume that the algorithm will find an Error Vector 
(-1,1). Assuming that the attacker wants to transmit the value ‘2’ (010), this Error Vector will be 
replaced by (1,0). 
In the same example, the decoder will search for Error Vectors that satisfy the same criteria. 
Once found, it will identify the (1,0) Error Vector and will convert it to the appropriate 
dictionary value (in this example - ‘2’). 
Our research and experiments demonstrate that the Error Vector threshold criteria of √2 can 
support a covert channel transmitted bandwidth of ~3kbs. This bandwidth was calculated 
according to the following formula: 
𝐵 =
𝑝 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠
 ∑
𝑁
𝑖=1
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒) 
Where p is the number of bits that represent each element in the dictionary. 
 
The Defense algorithm 
Our proposed defense algorithm consists of the same algorithm as above. The idea is to change 
the Error Vector which meet the criteria randomly.  
EXAMPLES 
After investigating this algorithm on one specific video file (frames: 100, size: 360 x 640, frame 
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rate: 25 frame/sec, overall bitrate: 2128 kbps, format: AVC/H.264, color space: YUV, Chrome 
subsampling: 4:2:0, Bit depth: 8 bits) we found out that we can create a cover channel inside this 
video with more than 3Kbps bandwidth. Changing threshold (changing the number of selected 
Error Vectors base on their size criteria) can change the cover channel bitrate. The value that 
determines our attack’s strength is the threshold level T, by decreasing the T value we get better 
results for minimum damaging the original video (has a slight effect on the video quality) while 
reducing the cover channel bandwidth. At the same time, this strong implementation has a slight 
effect on the video quality if we are increasing the threshold to higher values (more Error vectors 
are selected). In this case the results show that we can achieve higher covered channels 
bandwidth while keeping reasonable video quality. 
The 𝑇 value can be modified for different purposes. Where security is more important than 
image quality we would suggest to use a high 𝑇 value, and where the security has less 
importance than the video quality we suggest to use a low 𝑇 value. 
In this picture we demonstrate the macro-blocks that has any value of Error Vectors (the Red 
blocks) and macro blocks that has Error vectors with a size less than √2 – Yellow macro blocks 
(in this case criteria is  |Error Vector| ≤ √2)  
 
 
Graph showing the smallest amount of vectors revalued certain threshold in each frame. 
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The overall defense algorithm: After we inspected the effect of our technique on the video, we 
were able to create a cost –effectiveness graph of our entire defense algorithm, shown in Figure 
21, for creating this graph We can set different parameters for each of the threshold criteria, from 
delicate Error vectors changes to rough changes. This approach allows the users of the scheme to 
make risk analysis of their systems and set the acceptable quality degradation based on the cover 
percentage.  
 
 
 
NOVELTY 
In this short article we demonstrate how attacker can create cover channel with very reasonable 
bandwidth by exploiting estimated motion vector in H264 video stream. This technique can be 
done via proxies in near real time without the need to decode the all video there for it will 
consume very low CPU processing time and can become very attractive to attacker. The 
protection technic is very simple and using the same attack technique to insert random noise in 
the client side. The client can choose his protection level. If he trust the video source he can 
decrease the T level and to improve his video quality. If it is a suspect source, and the user insist 
to view this video content he will increase the T value (while reducing the video quality) and will 
be able to watch it safely. 
 
 
 
 
